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Abstract. eb3 is a specification language for information systems. The core of the eb3 language consists of
process algebraic specifications describing the behaviour of the entities in a system, and attribute function
definitions describing the entity attributes. The verification of eb3 specifications against temporal properties
is of great interest to users of eb3. In this paper, we propose a translation from eb3 to LOTOS NT (LNT for
short), a value-passing concurrent language with classical process algebra features. Our translation ensures
the one-to-one correspondence between states and transitions of the labelled transition systems corresponding
to the eb3 and LNT specifications. We automated this translation with the eb32lnt tool, thus equipping
the eb3 method with the functional verification features available in the CADP toolbox.
Keywords: Process Algebras, Information Systems, eb3, LOTOS NT, Model Checking, Verification
1. Introduction
The eb3 method [FSt03] is an event-based paradigm tailored for information systems (ISs). eb3 has been
used in the research projects selkis [MIL+11] and eb3sec [JFG+10], whose primary aim is the formal
specification of ISs with security policies. In the eb3sec project, real banking industry case studies have
been studied, describing interaction with brokers, customers and external financial systems. The selkis
project deals with two case studies from the medical domain. The first one draws data records from medical
imaging devices. The access to these records is done via web-based applications. The second one deals with
availability and confidentiality issues for medical emergency units evolving in a great mountain range, like
the Alps in that case.
A typical eb3 specification defines entities, associations, and their respective attributes. The process
algebraic nature of eb3 enables the explicit definition of intra-entity constraints, making them easy for the
IS designer to review and understand. Yet, its particular feature compared to classical process algebras, such
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as CSP [Hoa78], lies in the use of attribute functions, a special kind of recursive functions evaluated on
the system execution trace. Combined with guards, attribute functions facilitate the definition of complex
inter-entity constraints involving the history of events. The use of attribute functions simplifies system
understanding, enhances code modularity, and streamlines maintenance. However, given that ISs are complex
systems involving data management and concurrency, a rigorous design process based on formal specification
using eb3 must be completed with effective formal verification features.
Existing attempts for verifying eb3 specifications are based on translations from eb3 to other formal
methods equipped with verification capabilities. A first line of work [GFL05, GFL06] focused on devising
translations from eb3 attribute functions and processes to the B method [Abr05], which opened the way for
proving invariant properties of eb3 specifications using tools like Atelier B [Cl]. The B method is mainly used
to verify safety properties over system specifications. A full-scale verification of B specifications is impossible
under the classical B method. As a result, the B models of [GFL05, GFL06] were not suitable for verifying
liveness properties.
On the other hand, it is known that temporal logic can deal both with safety and liveness properties.
Hence, another approach concerned with the verification of temporal logic properties of eb3 specifications
by means of model checking techniques was taken. For this purpose, the formal description and verification
of an IS case-study using six verification tools was undertaken in [FFC10, Cho10]. This study revealed the
necessity of branching-time logics for accurately characterizing properties of ISs, and also the fact that process
algebraic languages are suitable for describing the behaviour and synchronization of IS entities. However, no
attempt of providing a systematic translation from eb3 to a target language accepted as input by a model
checker was made so far.
At first sight, given that eb3 has structured operational semantics based on a labelled transition system
(LTS) model, its translation to a process algebra may seem straightforward. However, this exercise proved
to be rather complex, the main difficulty being to translate a history-based language (the control-flow
depends on the entire system trace) to a process algebra with standard LTS semantics. On the other hand,
the original trace-based semantics defined for finite-state systems in [FSt03] denoted SemT gives rise to
unbounded memory models as the current trace is part of the current system state and, therefore, in the
absence of good abstractions capable of reducing them to finite-state models, only bounded model-checking
can be applied [BCC+99]. This restriction is present in the original approach [FSt03] and the subsequent
model-checking attempt [FFC10] even if all entities considered in the IS are finite.
To overcome this difficulty, [VD13] proposes a formal semantics for eb3 that treats attribute functions
as state variables, the so-called attribute variables. Intuitively, coding attribute functions as part of the
system state is beneficial from a model-checking point of view as the new formalisation dispenses with the
system trace. The derived memory semantics denoted SemM serves as the basis for applying a simulation
strategy of attribute variables in LNT, a new generation process algebraic specification language inspired
from E-LOTOS [Lot01]. In the same paper, SemM are shown to be equivalent to SemT. Again no complete
translation of eb3 to LNT is provided.
Contribution
1. Based on the efficient memory SemM given in [VD13], we propose a rigorous translation algorithm from
eb3 to LNT [CCG05]. As far as we know, this is the first attempt to provide a general translation from
eb3 to a classical value-passing process algebra. Since our primary objective was to provide temporal
property verification features for eb3, we focused our attention on LNT, which is one of the input
languages accepted by the CADP verification toolbox [GLMS10], and hence is equipped with on-the-fly
model checking for action-based, branching-time logics involving data. Another important ingredient of
the translation was the multiway value-passing rendezvous of LNT, which enabled to obtain a one-to-one
correspondence between the transitions of the two LTSs underlying the eb3 and LNT descriptions, and
hence to preserve strong bisimulation. The presence of array types and of usual programming language
constructs (e.g., loops and conditionals) in LNT was also helpful for specifying the memory, the Kleene
star-closure operators, and the eb3 guarded expressions containing attribute function calls. At last, the
constructed data types and pattern-matching mechanisms of LNT enabled a natural description of eb3
data types and attribute functions.
2. We implemented our translation in the eb32lnt tool, thus making possible the analysis of eb3 spec-
ifications using all the state-of-the-art features of the CADP toolbox, in particular the verification of
data-based temporal properties expressed in MCL [MT08] using the on-the-fly model checker EVALUA-
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TOR 4.0. The formal correctness proof of equivalence for eb3 specifications and the corresponding LNT
specifications can be found in [Vek14].
The paper is organized as follows:
• Section 2 presents the functional requirements of an IS and the related eb3 specification that serves as
the basis for introducing eb3 ’s syntax in Section 3.
• Section 4 discusses the verification requirements that will be addressed in this paper and Section 5
explains why existing literature does not suffice to address them.
• Section 6 presents the memory semantics SemM of eb3 and compares it in terms of efficiency to the
standard traced-based semantics SemT.
• Section 7 gives an overview of the eb3 and LNT languages.
• Section 8 introduces MCL briefly.
• Section 9 presents our translation from eb3 to LNT, implemented by the eb32lnt translator.
• Section 10 shows how eb32lnt, CADP and MCL can be used for verifying the correctness requirements
of an IS.
• Section 11 summarizes the results and draws up lines for future work.
2. Example
We present the syntax of eb3 by way of an intuitive example. First, we give the functional requirements of
a library management system:
R1. A book can be acquired by the library. It can be discarded, but only if it has not been lent.
R2. An individual must join the library in order to borrow a book.
R3. A member can relinquish library membership only when all his loans have been returned.
R4. A member cannot borrow more than the loan limit defined at the system level for all users.
The eb3 specification intended to satisfy these requirements is presented in Figure 1. Note that pro-
cess main is the parallel interleaving between m instances of process book executed an arbitrary but
bounded number of times (Kleene Closure ∗) and p instances of process member executed an arbitrary
but bounded number of times. Process book stands for a book acquisition “Acquire (bId)” followed by its
eventual discard “Discard (bId)”. The attribute function “borrower (T, bId)” looks for actions of the form
“Lend (mId , bId)” or “Return (bId)” in the trace T and returns the current borrower of book bId denoted
as “borrower (front (T), bId)” or ⊥ if the book is not lent. In process book , action “Discard (bId)” is thus
guarded to guarantee that book bId cannot be discarded if it is currently lent. Process loan stands for a book
loan “Lend (bId , mId)” followed by an eventual return to the library “Return (bId)”. The attribute function
“nbLoans (T,mId)” inspects for actions of the form “Lend (bId ,mId)” incrementing the current number of
mId ’s loans and inspects for actions of the form “Return (bId)” decrementing the current number of mId ’s
loans. In process loan, action “Lend (bId , mId)” is thus guarded to guarantee that book bId is not currently
being lent and member mId ’s loans is inferior to NbLoans. Process member stands for a member registration
followed by an arbitrary but bounded number of loans and an eventual membership annulment.
3. The Language EB3
The eb3 method has been specially designed to specify the functional behaviour of ISs. A standard eb3
specification comprises:
1. a class diagram representing entity types and associations for the IS being specified,
2. a process algebra specification, denoted by main, describing the IS, i.e., the valid traces of execution
describing its behaviour,
3. a set of attribute function definitions, which are recursive functions on the system execution trace, and
4. input/output rules to specify outputs for input traces, or SQL expressions used to specify queries on the
class diagram.
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BID = {b1, . . . , bm},MID = {m1, . . . ,mp}
book (bId : BID) =
Acquire (bId) . (borrower (T, bId) = ⊥)⇒ Discard (bId)
loan (mId : MID , bId : BID) =
(borrower (T, bId) = ⊥) ∧ (nbLoans (T,mId) < NbLoans)⇒
Lend (bId , mId) . Return (bId)
member (mId : MID) =
Register (mId) . (|||bId : BID : loan (mId , bId)∗) . Unregister (mId)
main =
(|||bId : BID : book (bId)∗) ||| (|||mId : MID : member (mId)∗)
nbLoans (T : T ,mId : MID) : Nat⊥ = borrower (T : T , bId : BID) : MID⊥ =
match last (T) with match last (T) with
⊥ : ⊥ ⊥ : ⊥
| Lend (bId ,mId) : | Lend (bId ,mId) : mId
nbLoans (front (T),mId) + 1 | Return (bId) : ⊥
| Register (mId) : 0 | : borrower (front (T), bId)
| Unregister (mId) : ⊥ end match
| Return (bId) :
if mId = borrower (T, bId) then
nbLoans (front (T),mId)− 1
else nbLoans (front (T),mId) end if
| : nbLoans (front (T),mId)
end match
Fig. 1. eb3 specification of a library management system
EB3 ::= A1; . . . ;An;S1; . . . ;Sm
A ::= f (T : T , y : T ) : T = match last (T) with
⊥ : v0 | α1 (x1) : v1 | . . . | αq (xq) : vq [| : vq+1]
S ::= P (x) = E
E ::= λ α (v) E1.E2 E1 |E2 E0
∗ E1 |[∆]|E2 |x :V :E0
|[∆]|x :V :E0 C ⇒ E P (v)
Fig. 2. eb3 syntax
We limit the presentation to the process algebra and the set of attribute functions. The eb3 syntax is
presented in Figure 2 and the eb3 memory semantics SemM [VD13] are given in Figure 3 as a set of Rules
named M1 to M11. Both figures are commented below. The equivalence of the original trace semantics SemT
[FSt03] and SemM can be found in [VD13].
We write x, y, x1, x2, . . . for variables and v, w, v1, v2, . . . for data expressions over user-defined domains,
such as integers, Booleans and more complex domains that we do not give formally, for conciseness. Let
Act be a set of actions written ρ, ρ1, ρ2, . . . and Lab be a set of labels written α, α1, α2, . . .. Each action ρ is
either the internal action written λ, or a visible action of the form “α (v)”, where α ∈ Lab. Hence, visible
actions consist of labels and data vectors. The notion of eb3 actions coincides with the notion of CSP internal
actions [Hoa78]. We also use the overlined notation as a shorthand notation for lists, e.g., x denotes a list of
variables x1, . . . , xn of arbitrary length. An eb
3 specification consists of a set of attribute function definitions
A1, . . . , An, and of a set of process definitions of the form “P (x) = E”, where P is a process name and E is
a process expression.
Attribute functions. Attribute function definitions are denoted by the symbol A in the grammar of
Figure 2. We assume a set of labels Lab = {α1, . . . , αq} (λ not included). Each αj has formal parameters
xj . Attribute functions {f1, . . . , fn} are defined recursively on the current trace T representing the history
of actions with the aid of functions last (T) which denotes the last action of the trace, and front (T) which
denotes the trace without its last action. The symbol ⊥ represents the undefined value. In particular, both
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(M1)
ρ
ρ−→ √
(M7)
E1
ρ−→ E′1 E2 ρ−→ E′2
E1 |[∆]|E2
ρ−→ E′1 |[∆]|E′2
in (ρ,∆)
(M2)
E1
ρ−→ E′1
E1.E2
ρ−→ E′1.E2
(M8)
E1
ρ−→ E′1
E1 |[∆]|E2
ρ−→ E′1 |[∆]|E2
¬in (ρ,∆)
(M3)
E2
ρ−→ E′2√
.E2
ρ−→ E′2
(M9) √
|[∆]|
√ λ−→ √
(M4)
E1
ρ−→ E′1
E1 |E2
ρ−→ E′1
(M10)
E0
ρ−→ E′0
C ⇒ E0 ρ−→ E′0
‖C [ f (T, v) := f[ v ] ]‖
(M5)
E0
∗ λ−→ √
(M11)
E[x := v]
ρ−→ E′
P (v)
ρ−→ E′
P (x) = E
(M6)
E0
ρ−→ E′0
E0
∗ ρ−→ E′0.E0∗
Fig. 3. eb3 memory semantics SemM
last (T) and front (T) match ⊥ when the trace is empty. The symbol (wildcard) matches all actions not
matched by any of the preceding action patterns α1 (x1), . . . , αq (xq).
Note that the attribute functions fi share the same vector of formal parameters y, which we call attribute
vector1, modulo renaming, and, therefore, have the same arity, which is by no means restrictive in terms of
language expressiveness. Each vi for i ∈ {0, . . . , n} is an expression of the same type as f ’s return type built
over the variables y ∪ xi. In real eb3 specifications with distinct formal parameters yi each corresponding to
every fi, y can be formalized as the union of the yi, i ∈ 1..n. We also assume that the attribute functions
are ordered, so that for all h ∈ 1..n, i ∈ 1..n, j ∈ 1..q, every function call of the form “fh (T, . . .)” occurring
in wji satisfies h < i and every call of the form “fh (front (T), . . .)” satisfies h ≥ 0. Such an ordering can
be constructed if the eb3 specification does not contain circular dependencies between function calls, which
would potentially lead to infinite attribute function evaluation. In particular, the definition of an attribute
function fi cannot contain recursive calls of the form “fi (T, . . .)”, but only recursive calls of the form
“fi (front (T), . . .)”. Note that this does not limit the expressiveness of eb
3 attribute functions, because every
recursive computation on data expressions only (which keeps the trace unchanged) can be described using
standard functions and not attribute functions. The eb3 specification of Figure 1 satisfies this ordering,
as the definition of borrower contains calls of the form “borrower (front (T), bId)”, while the definition of
nbLoans contains calls of the form “nbLoans (front (T),mId)” and “borrower (T, bId)”.
Process expressions. Expressions are built over variables, constants, and standard operations. An action
ρ is the simplest process expression, whose semantics are given by Rule M1. The symbol
√
(which is not
part of the user syntax) denotes successful execution. The trace T of an eb3 specification at a given moment
consists of the sequence of visible actions executed since the start of the system. (Note therefore that λ does
not appear in the trace.) At system start, the trace is empty. If T denotes the current trace and action ρ can
be executed, then T.ρ denotes the trace just after executing ρ.
eb3 processes can be combined with classical process algebra operators such as the sequence “E1.E2”
(M2,M3), the choice “E1 |E2” (M4) and the Kleene closure “E0
∗” (M5,M6). Rules (M7 to M9) define
parallel composition “E1 |[∆]|E2” of E1, E2 with synchronization on ∆ ⊆ Lab. The condition “in (ρ,∆)”
is true iff the label of ρ belongs to ∆. The symmetric Rules for choice and parallel composition have been
omitted for brevity. Expressions “E1 |||E2” and “E1 ||E2” are equivalent respectively to “E1 |[∅]|E2” and
“E1 |[Lab]|E2”.
1 each y ∈ y is called attribute parameter correspondingly
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Quantification is permitted for choice and parallel composition. If V is a set of expressions {v1, . . . , vn},
“|x : V : E0” and “|[∆]|x : V : E0” stand respectively for “E0[x := v1] | . . . |E0[x := vn]” and “E0[x :=
v1] |[∆]| . . . |[∆]|E0[x := vn]”, where “E[x := v]” denotes the replacement of all occurrences of x by v in
E. For instance, “||x :{1, 2, 3} :a (x)” stands for “a (1) || a (2) || a (3)”.
At last, named processes can be instantiated as usual (M11). Given an eb
3 process expression E, we write
vars (E) for the set of variables occurring free in E.
4. Verification Requirements
We need to verify that the eb3 specification of Figure 1 satisfies the functional requirements of the simplified
library management system presented in Section 2. To this end, we divide them into liveness and safety
properties. Liveness properties express the possibility that a certain event will take place and safety properties
express the certitude that a certain event will never take place. Requirements R1 and R3 are typical liveness
properties and requirements R2 and R4 are typical safety properties.
5. Related Works
Following the technique of [GFL05, GFL06], one may devise a translation from the eb3 specification of
Figure 1 to the B method. This approach suffices to verify requirements R2 and R4, since safety properties
can be formalized in the B method, but the verification of requirements R1 and R3 cannot be addressed by
way of classical refinement techniques. An important class of liveness properties can be verified in Event-
B [Abr10] as explained in [HA11, Gro06]. In [HA11], the system is defined as an Event-B model and the
liveness property φ in question is expressed in Linear Tree Logic (LTL) [Pnu77]. Then, the Bu¨chi automaton
corresponding to φ is translated to an equivalent Event-B model that is added to the initial Event-B model.
Finally, the consistency of the final model implies the satisfaction of φ. In [Gro06], the liveness property
φ is expressed as proof obligations of the Event-B model, whose resolution implies the satisfaction of φ.
More recent work [STW+14] in the field sets a framework for preserving liveness and fairness properties in
LTL along successive refinement steps of Event-B machines. The refinement of events is allowed among the
possible refinement steps of this scheme.
However, the use of LTL is usually inadequate for the verification of liveness properties over ISs. The
reason lies in the presence of loops in the IS specification leading to infinite paths. To see this, let’s consider
a certain class of liveness properties called reachability properties. Reachability properties can be expressed
in Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [CES86] formulas “AG(ψ ⇒ EFφ)” that are satisfied if for all states
that are reachable from the initial states of the system, where formula ψ is valid, there is a sequence of
transitions that lead to states of the system, where formula φ is valid. Reachability properties cannot be
expressed and verified in LTL. Instead, only branching-time logics like CTL can be used for this purpose.
Hence, the verification techniques of [HA11, Gro06, STW+14] are not applicable here.
In [ETL+04], the authors propose the translation of eb3 specifications to equivalent CSP‖B [ST05,
TSB03] specifications. CSP‖B is an hybrid method that combines features of CSP and the B method. The
dynamic behaviour of the IS in question is directly cast to a CSP specification. CSP shares common process
algebraic features with eb3. The system state inherent to the attribute function definitions has to be defined
explicitly via the state variables of a B specification. Then, every CSP action execution triggers a unique
operation of the B specification that has an immediate effect on the state variables. The properties over the
CSP‖B specification have to be expressed in CSP and the verification is carried out by the FDR2 model
checker [Fdr97]. Liveness properties expressed as temporal properties can be cast to FDR2 as explained in
[LMC00]. As a result, both liveness and safety properties of the library specification can be verified with the
aid of refinement checking and the FDR2 model checker. Although the method of [ETL+04] is systematic,
the translation of eb3 specifications to equivalent CSP‖B models is not automatic, but still necessitates user
intervention.
On the other hand, it is known that temporal logic can deal both with safety and liveness properties.
Hence, another approach concerned with the verification of temporal logic properties of eb3 specifications
by means of model checking techniques is taken. For this purpose, the formal description and verification of
the library management system specification [Ger06] using six verification tools are undertaken in [FFC10,
Cho10] namely SPIN [Hol04], NuSMV [CCG+02], FDR2, CADP, ALLOY [Jac06] and ProB [LB03]. SPIN,
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CADP and FDR2 are called explicit model checkers. In CADP and FDR2, the transition system describing
the system specification is constructed explicitly prior to the property verification, whereas in the case of
SPIN, the property is verified while the transition system is constructed in parallel (on-the-fly verification).
Nu-SMV belongs to a group of model-checkers called symbolic model checkers. In symbolic model checking
language specifications, the transition system is given in the form of Boolean formula. ALLOY is a language
based on first-order logic. Moreover, ALLOY models are defined purely as sets and relations on these sets.
Properties are expressed as boolean expressions and verification is reduced to the SAT problem. It is worth
mentioning that ALLOY’s language used to model the system is the same as the language used to specify the
property we need to verify. The same applies to PROB, whereas Spin, CADP, NuSMV use either action-based
or state-based temporal logics.
In the case of ALLOY and the case of reachability properties, the authors of [FFC10] specified (manually)
ad hoc traces leading to the states of the system model satisfying these properties, which is the reason why
ALLOY was proven to be the most efficient among the six verification tools used in the paper. The drawback
of this approach is that it necessitates good knowledge of the underlying transition system by the user. As
a whole, the study in [FFC10] revealed the necessity of branching-time logics for accurately characterizing
properties of ISs, and the fact that process algebraic languages are suitable for describing the behaviour
and synchronization of IS entities. However, no attempt of providing a systematic translation from eb3 to a
target language accepted as input by a model checker is made so far.
In [MF15], the verification of reachability properties “AG(ψ ⇒ EFφ)” with the aid of the B method is
undertaken. The goal of this study is to construct a program p that refines a reachability property q in the
sense that the set of execution paths related to program p is strictly a subset of the execution paths related
to the satisfaction of reachability formula q. The construction of p follows the algorithmic refinement laws
of Morgan [Mor98] that are intended to decompose q into a sequence of properties, which can be trivially
refined by simple system transitions (actions). This method is not automatic, as the user is asked to specify
the program that refines the given specification.
In this article, we address the problem of automatic translation (no user intervention) of eb3 models to
equivalent LNT models knowing that:
• LNT is one of the input languages accepted by the CADP verification toolbox featuring full-blown
temporal property validation capabilities, and that
• the model checking on LNT models allows branching-time reasoning, hence allowing the verification of
liveness properties on IS specifications.
6. Memory Semantics
We define the memory semantics SemM [VD13] and demonstrate by way of example why SemM surpasses
the original trace-based memory SemT [FSt03] in terms of efficiency. For defining the SemM semantics for
attribute functions, attribute functions are turned into state variables (the memory M = {f1, . . . , fn}) carrying
the effect of the system trace on their corresponding values. This avoids keeping the (ever-growing) trace
leading to a finite state model. If fi (T, x1 :T1, . . . , xl :Tl) is an attribute function, we construct |T1|× . . .×|Tl|
state variables denoted by fi, where |Ti| (i ∈ 1..l) stands for Ti’s cardinality. Then, f ′i denoting fi’s update
upon execution of αj (vj) is given as follows:
M′ = {f ′1, . . . , f ′n} (1)
f ′i [x] = ‖ wji [ fh (T, vh)← fh′[ vh ] | h < i ] (2)
[ fh (front (T), vh)← fh[ vh ] | h ≥ 0 ] ‖ (x) for j > 0 (3)
where the notation ‖.‖ denotes the evaluation of data expressions based on the classic interpretations for
Peano Arithmetic, Set Theory and Boolean Logic under the current memory M (implicit both in Figure 3
and above) carries the values of attribute variables. If action αj (vj) can be executed, then M
′ denotes the
memory after its execution. By definition, the inert action λ has no effect on the memory M, i.e. M′ = M.
The memory M is successively updated from f1, .., fn to M
′ = {f1′, . . . , fn′} as depicted in Definition (3). Calls
of the form fh (T, vh) within w
j
i are replaced by already-updated fh
′[ vh ], since fh takes T as argument for
h < i. Calls of the form fh (T, vh) are replaced by the value of fh[ vh ], since fh takes front (T) as argument
for h ≥ 0. This computation caters for the complete discharge of the trace T from wji , while consistently
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Memory
State borrower[b1] borrower[b2] nbLoans[m1] nbLoans[m2]
A ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
A’ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
B ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
B’ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ 0
C ⊥ ⊥ 0 0
D m1 ⊥ 1 0
Fig. 4. Evolution of Atrribute variables
updating the memory M. We denote by M0 = {f01 , . . . , f0n} the memory at system start, which corresponds
to “T = [ ]” and “j = 0” and set f0i [x] = ⊥ for every parameter vector x and every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The guarded expression process “C ⇒ E0” (M10) can execute E0 if the Boolean condition C holds under
memory M, which is denoted by the side condition “‖C [ fi (T, v) := fi[ v ] ]‖” such that “M = {f1, . . . , fn}”.
Since C may contain calls to attribute functions of the form f (T, v), the evaluation of C necessitates their
replacement by their corresponding attribute variables f[ v ]. The trace T is discharged from C and, hence,
the evaluation of the guard C does not depend on T. Note that the evaluation of C and the execution of the
first action ρ in E0 are simultaneous, i.e., no action is allowed in concurrent processes in the meantime. We
call this property the guard-action atomicity. This property is essential for consistency as, by side effects,
the occurrence of actions in concurrent processes could implicitly change the value of C before the guarded
action has been executed.
Execution. We demonstrate how the memory semantics SemM works for the simplified library management
system, whose specification (processes and attribute functions) in eb3 is given in Figure 1. As an example,
we set m = p = NbLoans = 2, i.e. we consider two books b1 and b2, and two members m1 and m2. The
memory has four cells:
M = (borrower [b1], borrower [b2],nbLoans[m1],nbLoans[m2]).
The first two cells keep the two values of the attribute function borrower (T, •) for a given trace T, and the
last two keep the values of nbLoans (T, •). After every step, the new value of each cell can be calculated
from the previous memory and the action that has just been executed. The memory is initially set to
(⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥). After the trace “Acquire (b1).Acquire (b2).Register (m1).Register (m2)” the memory contains
(⊥,⊥, 0, 0). If the action “Lend (b1,m1)” is then executed, the new memory is (m1,⊥, 1, 0). For instance,
the new value m1 for borrower [b1] is obtained from the Rule “Lend (bId ,mId) : mId” in the definition of the
attribute function borrower (see Fig. 1), and the new value 1 for nbLoans[m1] by the Rule “Lend (bId ,mId) :
nbLoans (front (T),mId) + 1” of the attribute function nbLoans, where the value of nbLoans (front (T),m1)
corresponds to the value of nbLoans[m1] in the previous memory state (value 0). The evolution of attribute
variables is depicted in Figure 4, where (A’) is the state after the execution of Acquire (b1), (B) is the state
the moment succeeding the execution of Acquire (b2), (B’) is the state the moment succeeding the execution
of Register (m1), (C) is the state the moment succeeding the execution of Register (m2) and (D) is the state
the moment succeeding the execution of Lend (b1,m1).
Figure 5 depicts the evolution of process expression main describing the library management system in
states (A), (B), (C), and (D). Transition (C)→(D) entails the evaluation of the following guard:
(borrower (T, b1) = ⊥) ∧ (nbLoans (T,m1) < 2) (4)
where T corresponds to the system trace at state (C), i.e. T = TC . Condition (4) illustrates the con-
ditions under which member m1 can lend book b1 (notably if the book is available and the number of
loans carried out by m1 is inferior to two). We concentrate on the evaluation of the attribute function call
“borrower (T, b1)” w.r.t. SemM and then we compare it with the evaluation of “borrower (T, b1)” w.r.t. the
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main (A)
Acquire (b2). Acquire (b1)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
borrower (TB , b1) = ⊥ → Discard (b1). book (b1)∗ |||
borrower (TB , b2) = ⊥ → Discard (b2). book (b2)∗ |||
( ||| mId : MID : member (mId)∗ ) (B)
Register (m2). Register (m1)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
borrower (TC , b1) = ⊥ → Discard (b1). book (b1)∗ |||
borrower (TC , b2) = ⊥ → Discard (b2). book (b2)∗ |||
( ||| bId : BID : loan (m1, bId)∗ ). Unregister (m1). member (m1)∗ |||
( ||| bId : BID : loan (m2, bId)∗ ). Unregister (m1). member (m2)∗ (C)
Lend (b1, m1)−−−−−−−−−−−→
borrower (TD, b1) = ⊥ → Discard (b1). book (b1)∗ |||
borrower (TD, b2) = ⊥ → Discard (b2). book (b2)∗ |||
(Return(b1). loan(m1, b1)
∗ ||| loan(m1, b2)∗). Unregister (m1). member (m1)∗ |||
( ||| bId : BID : loan (m2, bId)
∗). Unregister (m1). member (m2)∗ (D)
Fig. 5. Sample execution
classical traced-based memory SemT. Following (3) and the definition of borrower in Figure 1, attribute
function call “borrower (T, b1)” is evaluated w.r.t. SemM as follows:
‖ borrower(TC , b1) ‖ = borrowerB′ [b1] = ⊥
where “borrowerB′ [b1]” is the (stocked) attribute variable at state (B’). Following the attribute function
definition of borrower in Figure 1, the evaluation of “borrower (TC , b1)” w.r.t. SemT (the standard ML-like
evaluation of recursive functions denoted as ‖.‖T to mark the difference with the ‖.‖ evaluation) triggers the
complete traversal of the whole trace as demonstrated below:
‖ borrower(TC , b1) ‖T = ‖ borrower (front (TC), b1) ‖T
= ‖ borrower (TB′ , b1) ‖T
= ‖ borrower (front (TB′), b1
) ‖T
= ‖ borrower (TB , b1) ‖T
= ‖ borrower (front (TB), b1) ‖T
= ‖ borrower (TA′ , b1) ‖T
= ‖ borrower (front (TA′), b1) ‖T
= ‖ borrower (TA, b1) ‖T
= ‖ ⊥ ‖T = ⊥
from which follows directly that SemM is computationally more efficient than SemT.
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B ::= stop null G (O1, . . . , On) where E B1;B2
if E then B1 else B2 end if var x :T in B end var x := E
loop L in B end loop break L select B1 [] . . . [] Bn end select
par G1, . . . , Gm in B1 || . . . ||Bn end par P[G1, . . . , Gn] (E1, . . . , En)
O ::= !E ?x
Fig. 6. LNT syntax (limited to the fragment used in this paper)
7. The Language LNT
LNT aims at providing the best features of imperative and functional programming languages and value-
passing process algebras. It has a user friendly syntax and formal operational semantics defined in terms of
labeled transition systems (LTSs). LNT is supported by the LNT.OPEN tool of CADP, which allows the
on-the-fly exploration of the LTS corresponding to a LNT specification.
We present the fragment of LNT that serves as the target of our translation. LNT terms B also called
as behaviours are built from actions, choice (select), conditional (if), sequential composition (;), breakable
loop (loop and break) and parallel composition (par). Communication is carried out by rendezvous on
gates, written G, G1, . . . , Gm, and may be guarded using Boolean conditions on the received values (where
clause). LNT allows multiway rendezvous with bidirectional (send/receive) value exchange on the same gate
occurrence, each offer O being either a send offer (!) or a receive offer (?), independently of the other offers.
Expressions E are built from variables, type constructors, function applications and constants. Labels L
identify loops, which can be escaped using “break L” from inside the loop body. Processes are parameterized
by gates and data variables. LNT syntax and semantics are formally defined in SOS style in [CCG05].
8. MCL
MCL is an extension of the alternation-free modal µ-calculus [EL+86] with action predicates enabling value
extraction, modalities containing extended regular expressions on transition sequences, quantified variables
and parameterized fixed point operators, programming language constructs, and fairness operators encoding
generalized Bu¨chi automata. These features make possible a concise and intuitive description of safety,
liveness, and fairness properties involving data, without sacrificing the efficiency of on-the-fly model checking,
which has a linear-time complexity for the dataless MCL formulas [MT08].
In particular, MCL consists of data expressions e, action formulas α and state formulas φ. Let a set of
data variables X and a set of function identifiers F with standard interpretation. Data expressions e are
defined as follows:
e ::= x | f(e1, . . . , en),
where x ∈ X and f ∈ F denoting typed function identifiers.
Action formulas α consist of:
• action patterns of the form {c !e1 . . . !en} such that, if action {c v1 . . . vn} occurs, vk matches expression
ek for k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
• action patterns of the form {c ?x1 : T1 . . . ?xn : Tn}2 such that, if action {c v1 . . . vn} occurs, vk is
assigned to variable xk for k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
• usual Boolean operators.
To sum up, the abstract syntax of action formulas α is given by the following grammar:
α ::= {c !e1 . . . !en} | {c ?x1 : T1 . . . ?xn : Tn} | ¬α | α1 ∧ α2 | α∗
Let propositional variables Y ∈ Y that denote functions F : T1× . . .×Tn → 2S ∈ F , where T1, . . . , Tn are
domains and S is the state space. State formulas consist of data expressions, propositional variables Y ∈ Y,
boolean operators, quantifiers and fixed point operators.
2 Tk denotes xk’s type as well as the corresponding domain of elements that can be assigned to xk
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Note also that fixed point operations fall within the scope of an even number of negations (MCL formulas
µ(. . .)Y.φ and ν(. . .)Y.φ are syntactically monotonic) [Koz83]. For the efficiency of model checking, mutual
recursion between minimal and maximal fixed point operators is not allowed [EL+86].
We assign values to propositional variables x ∈ X appearing in expressions e and action formulas α that
are denoted as δ : X → T1 ∪ . . . ∪ Tn. Moreover, we assign functions to all free propositional variables Y
appearing in MCL state formulas that are denoted as ρ : Y → F . Notations “µY.φ” and “νY.φ” denote the
corresponding fixed points of monotonic functions over Y → 2S .
Other useful operators like if and case can also be used to construct MCL formulas. Their definition is
found in [MT08].
Action patterns are enriched with additional features such as the wilcard clause any that matches any
value and the “where V ” clause denoting that the pattern-matching takes place on condition that condition
V evaluates to true. Remark that parameters ?x : T can appear syntactically in V .
The abstract syntax of MCL state formulas is given by the following grammar:
φ ::= e | ¬φ | φ1 ∨ φ2 | 〈α 〉 φ | µY. φ
| exists x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn. φ | Y (e1, . . . , en)
| let x1 : T1 := e1, . . . , xn : Tn := en in φ end let
| if φ1 then φ′1 elsif φ2 then φ′2 else φ′3 end if
| case e is p1 → φ1 | . . . | pn → φn end case
The necessity modality is the dual of possibility modality “[α ] φ = ¬〈α 〉 ¬φ”. The maximal fixed point
operator is the dual of the minimal fixed point operator: “ν(. . .)Y.φ = ¬µ(. . .)Y.¬φ[Y/¬Y ]”, where [Y/¬Y ]
denotes the syntactic substitution of Y by ¬Y . Note that “〈α∗ 〉 φ” is syntactic sugar for “µY (φ∨ 〈β 〉 Y )”.
MCL’s expressiveness is not limited to safety and liveness properties. Deadlock freedom is formalized as
“[ true∗ ] 〈 true 〉 true”. The fair reachability [QS83] of an action a is formalized as “[ (¬a)∗ ] 〈 (¬a)∗.a 〉 true”.
For more complex fairness properties, we use the infinite looping operator ∆β of PDL-∆ [Str82], denoted as
β@ in MCL, which states the existence of an infinite (unfair) sequence made by concatenating subsequences
satisfying β.
Let’s consider the following MCL example:
[ true∗ . {RESERVE ?M : string ?B : string} . (not ({TAKE !M !B}))∗ . {RESERVE !M !B} ] false
The expression inside [ . ] describes the set of execution paths starting with a bounded number of actions
(denoted as true∗) followed by a RESERVE action of book B by member M , a bounded number of actions
that are not TAKE actions of B by M and a RESERVE action of book B by member M . Finally, false notation
is used to denote that the paths described inside [ . ] are not possible (safety property).
9. Translation of EB3 to LNT
9.1. Translation of attribute functions.
Ordering attribute functions as described in Section 6 allows the memory to be updated consistently, from
f1 to fn in turn. At every instant, already-updated values correspond to calls of the form fh (T, . . .) (the
value of fh on the current trace), whereas calls of the form fh (front (T), . . .) are replaced by accesses to a
copy g of the memory f , which was made before starting the update. This encoding thus enables the trace
parameter to be discharged from function calls, ensuring that while updating fi, accesses to fh with h < i
necessarily correspond to calls with parameter T.
The process M is defined in Figure 7. It runs an infinite loop, which “listens” to all possible actions αj
of the system. At this point, we recall the existence of unique attribute function definition fi (T : T , y1 :
T1, . . . , ys : Ts) : T (see Figure 2 for details). Each attribute variable fi is an array with s dimensions, where
s is the common arity for attribute functions fi minus 1, because the trace parameter is now discharged.
Each dimension of array fi, thus, corresponds to one formal parameter in yi, so that:
fi[ord (v1)] . . . [ord (vs)]
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process M [α1, . . . , αq, λ : any] is
var f, g : T , y : T at, x : T ac in
upd01; . . . ; upd
0
n;
loop
g := f
select
α1 (?x, !f); upd
1
1; . . . ; upd
1
n
[] . . . []
αq (?x, !f); upd
q
1; . . . ; upd
q
n
[] λ (!f)
end select
end loop
end var
end process
Fig. 7. LNT code for the memory process implementing the attribute functions
upd ji
.
= enum (y, fi[ord (y)] := mod (w
j
i ))
enum ([ ], B)
.
= B
enum (yk :: z,B)
.
= yk := firstk;
loop Lk in
enum (z,B)
if yk 6= lastk then yk := nextk (yk) else break Lk end if
end loop
mod (w0i )
.
= w0i
[
fh (T, y) := fh[ord (y)]
∣∣ ∀h < n ][
fh (front (T), y) := ⊥
∣∣ ∀h ∈ {1, . . . , n} ]
mod (wji ) = w
j
i
[
fh (T, y) := fh[ord (y)]
∣∣ ∀h < n ][
fh (front (T), y) := gh[ord (y)]
∣∣ ∀h ∈ {1, . . . , n} ], if j 6= 0
Fig. 8. LNT code for expression updji of Figure 7
encodes the current value of:
fi (T, v1, . . . , vs),
where ord (vk) is a predefined LNT function that denotes the ordinate of the value that corresponds to
variable vk, i.e., a unique number between 1 and the cardinal number |Dk| of domain Dk that stocks
elements of type Tk.
Expression upd ji for i ∈ {1, . . . , q} and j ∈ {1, . . . , q} of Figure 7 is used to implement the effect of action
αj(x) on attribute variables fi. Its definition is given in Figure 8. In particular, upd
j
i is defined by way of
auxiliary function enum. For vector z = (z1, . . . , zo), yk :: z is equivalent notation for (yk, z1, . . . , zo) and
[ ] stands for the empty vector. For each type Tk, we assume the existence of functions firstk that returns
the first element of type T , lastk that returns the last element of type Tk, and nextk (x) that returns the
successor of x on condition that the type of variable x is Tk (following the total order induced by ord). For
example, let Tk = {m1,m2,m3}. Then, it is firstk = m1, nextk(m1) = m2, nextk(m2) = m3 and lastk = m3.
According to the definition of “enum (yx :: z,B)” of Figure 8, the loop structure is employed to assign
to yk the current element of domain Dk (the first element of Dk is assigned at first) and a recursive call
Verification of EB3 Specifications using CADP 13
to enum (z,B) is taken. If yk has not been assigned the last value of Dk, which is expressed by condition
yk 6= lastk, the next value of Dk is assigned to yk via yk := nextk (yk) and enum (z,B) is called once again.
Otherwise, the program breaks from the loop structure. This approach guarantees that, when computing the
effect of actions on attribute variables via assignment B, all attribute variables are taken into consideration.
Note also that enum depends on function mod (E) which transforms an expression E by syntactically
replacing function calls by array accesses as described previously. Namely according to the definition of
mod (wji ) of Figure 8, expressions of the form “fh (T, y)” are replaced by fh[ord (y)] and expressions of the
form “fh (front (T), y)” are replaced by gh[ord (y)] for all h < n. Recall at this point that the initial values
of attribute variables g are by convection equal to ⊥, which entails the replacement of attribute function calls
of the form “fh (front (T), y)” in eb
3 type (1) value expressions w0i by ⊥ for all h ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Notation
y : T at is an abbreviation for “y1 : T1, . . . , ys : Ts” and T denotes the vector (T, . . . , T ) of size n that is equal
to the number of attribute function names in the system.
Expression nextk (x) is implemented as LNT expression “val (ord (x)+1)”. Note that in LNT assignment
“x := val (i)” identifier val stands for the predefined LNT function that returns the i-th element of given
ordered set denoting the domain of x’s type. Such functions are available in LNT for all finite types.
Similarly, assuming common parameter vector x
.
= (x1, . . . , xp) for all action labels αj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , q}
or, equivalently, action name definitions of the form αj(x1 : T1, . . . , xp : Tp) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, we
define “x : T ac” that is equivalent to “x1 : T1, . . . , xp : Tp”, where types T1, . . . , Tp are not to be confused
with the types corresponding to the attribute parameters yk ∈ y for k ∈ {1, . . . , s} as seen earlier. Then,
upon synchronization on action αj (?x, !f) with the LNT process corresponding to eb
3’s main process (see
translation of processes below), the values of all attribute variables fi for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} are updated using
function upd ji .
As an example, we demonstrate how the definition of Figure 7 regarding the memory process, applies to
the eb3 specification of the library management system for one book and two members. Member and book
IDs are defined in the LNT program as follows:
type MID is m1,m2,m⊥ with ”eq”, ”ne”, ”ord”, ”val” end type
type BID is b1, b⊥ with ”eq”, ”ne”, ”ord”, ”val” end type
Identifier eq (ne) denotes the equality (inequality) operator among member IDs or book IDs. The bottom
value for member IDs is denoted as m⊥ and the bottom value for book IDs is denoted as b⊥. In the following,
the type referring to the number of books possessed by each member of the library is denoted as an array
NB and the type referring to the current borrower of each book is denoted as an array BOR. Hence, NB
and BOR are defined in LNT as follows:
type NB is array[0..2] of NAT end type
type BOR is array[0..1] of MID end type
Now, we need to explain how the execution of communication label LEND modifies attribute variable vectors
“borrower : BOR” and “nbLoans : NB”. First, we remark that, according to the eb3 specification of the
library management system, the execution of eb3 action “Lend (bId,mId)” modifies attribute variables
borrower[bId] and nbLoans[mId]. Hence, following the definition of Figure 7, we need an auxilliary variable
bId′ to go through all possible values of book IDs, i.e. the elements that inhabit BID ’s domain, in order to
simulate the modification of borrower[bId ] in case that book bId is lent to member mId . In each iteration of
the loop construct, it is checked if bId is equal to the current value of bId ′, in which case borrower[bId ] is
set to the current borrower, i.e. mId . Then, it is checked if bId ′ is equal to the last element of BID ’s domain,
i.e. b1, in which case the program control breaks from the loop construct. Otherwise, bId
′ is assigned the
next element in the ordered set of BID ’s domain, i.e. “bId ′ := val (ord (bId ′) + 1)”, and the execution of
the loop construct is repeated.
Similarly, we need an auxiliary variable mId ′ to go through all possible values of member IDs, i.e. the
elements that inhabit MID ’s domain, in order to simulate the modification of nbLoans[bId ] in case that
book bId is lent to member mId . In each iteration of the loop construct, it is checked if mId ′ coincides
with the current value of mId ′, in which case nbLoans[mId ] is increased by one. Then, it is checked if
mId ′ is equal to the last element of MID ’s domain, i.e. m2, in which case the program control breaks from
the loop construct. Otherwise, mId ′ is assigned the next element in the ordered set of MID ’s domain, i.e.
“mId ′ := val (ord (mId ′) + 1)”, and the execution of the loop construct is repeated.
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The code for the memory M is then given as follows:
process M [Acquire,Discard ,Register ,Unregister ,Lend ,Return : any] is
var mId : MID , bId : BID , bId ′ : BID ,
mId ′ : MID , borrower : BOR, nbLoans : NB in
borrower := BOR(m⊥); nbLoans := NB(0);
loop
select
Acquire (?bId)
[] Discard (?bId , ?borrower)
[] Register (?mId)
[] Unregister (?mId) [] Lend (?bId, ?mId , !nbLoans, !borrower);
bId ′ := b1;
loop L1 in
if (bId ′ eq bId) then
borrower [ord (bId ′)] := mId
end if ;
if (bId ′ eq b1) then
break L1
else
bId ′ := val (ord (bId ′) + 1)
end if ;
end loop
mId ′ := m1;
loop L2 in
if (mId ′ eq mId) then
nbLoans [ord (mId ′)] := nbLoans [ord (mId ′)] + 1
end if ;
if (mId ′ eq m2) then
break L2
else
mId ′ := val (ord (mId ′) + 1)
end if
end loop
[] RET (?bId);
mId ′ := m1;
loop L1 in
if (mId ′ eq borrower [ord (bId)]) then
nbLoans [ord (mId ′)] := nbLoans [ord (mId ′)]− 1
end if ;
if (mId ′ eq m2) then
break L1
else
mId ′ := val (ord (mId ′) + 1)
end if
end loop
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bId ′ := b1;
loop L1 in
if (bId ′ eq bId) then
borrower [ord (bId)] := m⊥
end if ;
if (bId ′ eq b1) then
break L1
else
bId ′ := val (ord (bId ′) + 1)
end if
end loop;
end select
end loop
end var
end process
Note that LNT statement “borrower := BOR(m⊥)” is equivalent to “borrower[ord (b1)] := m⊥”.
Similarly, “nbLoans := NB(0)” is equivalent to “nbLoans[ord (m1)] := 0; nbLoans[ord (m2)] := 0”. Note
that the initial number of loans is set to 0, whereas according to Figure 1 it should be set to ⊥. The reason
is that it is impossible to define Nat⊥ of Figure 1 without recourse to complex LNT data structures. Hence,
the symbol ⊥ of Figure 1 is basically matched to the symbol 0 in the above LNT program, the symbol 0 of
Figure 1 is matched to 1 in the above LNT program etc.
9.2. Optimizations.
Notice that the inert action λ has been removed from the previous LNT specification, since λ is does not
appear in the program script and, as a result, it is supposed not to affect the control flow.
Similarly, attribute variable vector f = (nbLoans, borrower) is removed from the parameter vector of
communication labels that synchronize with expressions of the form “α (v, ?f) where mod (C)” present
in other LNT processes (see Figure 9), for which the corresponding guard mod (C) makes no use of at-
tribute variable vector f . In particular, this optimization applies to communication labels Acquire, Register ,
Unregister and Return. The static analysis of LNT specifications cater for an efficient discovery of all guards,
as well as their related communication labels.
The only coordinates of attribute variable vector f = (nbLoans, borrower) passed as parameters to
the communication labels “α (v, ?f) where mod (C)” are exactly those appearing in mod (C). Notice, for
example, that vector nbLoans is not a subset of the parameter vector passed to communication label Discard ,
since the static analysis of the LNT specification reveals that no corresponding guard to Discard makes use
of nbLoans.
The code referring to attribute variables that remain unchanged during a communication is omitted. This
is the case for communication labels Acquire, Discard , Register and Unregister in the previous LNT code.
It turns out that the code simulating the effect of eb3 action “Lend (bId ,mId)” on attribute variables
borrower[bId ] and nbLoans[mId ] can be optimized based on the simple observation that attribute variables
borrower[bId ′] for bId ′ 6= bId and nbLoans[mId ′] for mId ′ 6= mId remain unaffected. Hence, the correspond-
ing part of process M regarding eb3 action “Lend (bId ,mId)” can be modified as follows:
[] Lend (?bId , ?mId , !nbLoans, !borrower);
borrower [ord (bId)] := mId ;
nbLoans [ord (mId)] := nbLoans [ord (mId)] + 1
A similar approach applies to communication label Ret . The optimized LNT specification of the library
management system is given in the appendix. Note that this optimization technique is applicable whenever
the in offers of the communication label in question, i.e. the parameters marked with ?, suffice to determine
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t (λ,C) = λ (?f) where mod (C) (1)
t (α (v), C) = α (v, ?f) where mod (C) (2)
t (E1.E2, C) = t (E1, C); t (E2, true) (3)
t (C ′ ⇒ E0, C) = t (E0, C andthen C ′) (4)
t (E1 |E2, C) = select t (E1, C) [] t (E2, C) end select (5)
t (|x : V :E0, C) = var x := any V ; t (E0, C) end var (6)
t (E0
∗, true) = loop LE0 in
select
λ (?f); break LE0 [] t (E0, true)
end select
end loop (7)
t (E1 |[∆]|E2, true) = par ∆ in t (E1, true) || t (E2, true) end par (8)
t (|[∆]|x :V :E0, true) = par ∆ in E0[x := v1] || . . . ||E0[x := vn] end par
where V = {v1, . . . , vn} (9)
t (P (v), true) = P [α1, . . . , αq, λ] (v) (10)
In all other cases:
t (E0, C) =

if mod (C) then t (E0, true) else stop end if
if C does not use attribute functions
par α1, . . . , αq, λ in
t (E0, true)
|| prC [α1, . . . , αq, λ] (vars (C))
end par otherwise
(11)
Fig. 9. Translation from eb3 process to LNT process
which attribute variables are modified. Based on our experience with eb3 specifications, this optimization
technique is often applicable on the corresponding LNT specifications. It is also incorporated on our tool
eb32lnt.
9.3. Translation of processes.
We define a translation function t from an eb3 process expression to an LNT process. Most eb3 constructs are
process algebra constructs with a direct correspondence in LNT. The main difficulty arises in the translation
of guarded process expressions of the form “C ⇒ E0” in a way that guarantees the guard-action atomicity .
This led us to consider a second parameter for the translation function t, namely the condition C, whose
evaluation is delayed until the first action occurring in the process expression E0. The definition of t (E,C)
is given in Figure 9. An eb3 specification E0 will then be translated into:
par α1, . . . , αq, λ in t (E0, true) || M [α1, . . . , αq, λ] end par
and every process definition of the form “P (x) = E” will be translated into the process:
process P [α1, . . . , αq, λ : any] (x : type (x)) is t (E, true) end process,
where {α1, . . . , αq} = Lab. The Rules of Figure 9 can be commented as follows:
• Rule (1) translates the λ action. Note that λ cannot be translated to the empty LNT statement null,
because execution of λ may depend on a guard C, whose evaluation requires the memory to be read,
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so as to get attribute variable values. This is done by the LNT communication action λ (?f). The guard
C is evaluated after replacing calls to attribute functions (all of which have the form fi (T, vi)) by the
appropriate attribute variables, using function mod defined in Figure 7. Rule (2) is similar but handles
visible actions.
• Rule (3) translates eb3 sequential composition into LNT sequential composition, passing the evaluation
of C to the first process expression.
• Rule (4) makes a conjunction between the guard of the current process expression with the guard already
accumulated from the context.
• Rules (5) and (6) translate the choice and quantified choice operators of eb3 into their direct LNT
counterpart.
• Rule (7) translates the Kleene closure into a combination of LNT loop and select, following the identity
E0
∗ = λ |E0.E0∗.
• Rule (8) translates eb3 parallel composition into LNT parallel composition.
• Rule (9) translates eb3 quantified parallel composition into LNT parallel composition by expanding the
type V of the quantification variable, since LNT does not have a quantified parallel composition operator.
• Rule (10) translates an eb3 process call into the corresponding LNT process call, which requires gates to
be passed as parameters.
• Rules (7) to (10) only apply when the guard C is trivially true. In the other cases, we must apply Rule
(11), which generates code implementing the guard. If C does not use attribute functions, i.e., does not
depend on the trace, then it can be evaluated immediately without communicating with the memory
process (first case). Otherwise, the guard evaluation must be delayed until the first action of the process
expression E0. When E0 is either a Kleene closure, a parallel composition, or a process call, identifying
its first action syntactically is not obvious. One solution would consist in expanding E0 into a choice
in which every branch has a fixed initial action3, to which the guard would be added. We preferred an
alternative solution that avoids the potential combinatorial explosion of code due to static expansion. A
process prC (defined in Figure 10) is placed in parallel to t (E0, true) and both processes synchronize on
all actions. Process prC imposes on t (E0, true) the constraint that the first executed action must satisfy
the condition C (then branch). For subsequent actions, the condition is relaxed (else branch).
3 Such a form, commonly called head normal form [BPS01], is used principally in the context of the process algebra ACP [BK85]
to analyse the behaviour of recursive processes.
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process prC [α1, . . . , αq, λ : any] (vars (C) : type (vars (C))) is
var start : bool, x : T ac, f : T in
start := true;
loop L in select
if start then
start := false;
select
α1 (?x, ?f) where mod (C)
[] . . . []
αq (?x, ?f) where mod (C)
[]
λ (?f) where mod (C)
end select
else
select
α1 (?x, ?f)
[] . . . []
αq (?x, ?f)
[]
λ (?f)
end select
end if
[] break L end select end loop
end var
end process
Fig. 10. Process prC
Example Revisited. The main process of the LNT specification describing the library management system
is defined as follows:
process Main [Acquire,Discard ,Register ,Unregister ,Lend ,Return : any] is
par Acquire,Discard ,Register ,Unregister ,Lend ,Return in
par
loop L in
select break L [] book [Acquire,Discard] (b1)
end select
end loop
||
par
loop L in
select break L [] member [Register ,Unregister ,Lend ,Return] (m1)
end select
end loop
||
loop L in
select break L [] member [Register ,Unregister ,Lend ,Return] (m2)
end select
end loop
end par
end par
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||
M [Acquire,Discard ,Register ,Unregister ,Lend ,Return]
end par
end process
Note that the equivant LNT process of eb3 process main is placed in parallel to memory processM . Moreover,
the simulation of eb3 quantified parallel synchronization operator (that has no equivalent operator in LNT)
is applied to eb3 expressions “|||bId : BID : book (bId)∗” and “|||mId : MID : member (mId)∗” and the eb3
Kleene Closure operator is simulated as described in Figure 9.
The body of LNT processes book and member is defined as below:
process book [Acquire,Discard : any] (bId : BOOKID) is
var borrower : BOR in
Acquire(bid); Discard (bId, ?borrower) where (borrower [ord (bId)] eq m⊥)
end var
end process
process member [Register ,Unregister ,Lend ,Return : any] (mId : MEMBERID) is
Register (mId);
loop L in
select break L [] loan [Lend ,Return] (mId, b1)
end select
end loop;
Unregister (mId)
end process
The definition of LNT process member depends on LNT process loan, whose definition is given below:
process loan [Lend ,Return : any] (mId : MEMBERID , bId : BOOKID) is
var borrower : BOR, nbLoans : NB in (* NbLoans is set to 1 *) in
Lend (bId, mId, ?nbLoans, ?borrower)
where
(
(borrower [ord (bId)] eq m⊥) and (nbLoans [ord (mId)] eq 1)
)
;
Return (bId)
end var
end process
The following example illustrates and justifies the use of process prC as a means to solve the guard-action
atomicity problem. Consider the eb3 system:
C ⇒ Lend (b1, m1) ||| Return (b2),
where C denotes the Boolean condition:
borrower (T, b1) = ⊥ ∧ nbLoans (T, m1) < NbLoans
and Lab = {Lend ,Return}. The LNT code corresponding to this system is the following:
par Lend ,Return, λ in
par Lend ,Return, λ in
par Lend (b1, m1, ?f) || Return (b2, ?f) end par
|| prC [Lend ,Return, λ] (b1, m1)
end par
|| M [Lend ,Return, λ]
end par
The first action executed by this system may be either Lend or Return. We consider the case where
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Lend is executed first. According to the LNT semantics, it results from the multiway synchronization of the
following three actions:
• “Lend (b1, m1, ?f)” in the above expression,
• “Lend (?b, ?m, ?f) where borrower [ord(b1)] = ⊥ ∧ nbLoans[ord(m1)] < NbLoans” in process prC (at
this moment, start is true, see Fig. 10), and
• “Lend (?b, ?m, !f)” in process M (see Fig. 7).
Thus, in prC at synchronization time, f is an up-to-date copy of the memory stored in M , b = b1, and
m = m1. The only condition for the synchronization to occur is the guard mod (C), whose value is computed
using the up-to-date copy f of the memory. In case mod (C) evaluates to true, no other action (susceptible
to modifying f) can occur between the evaluation of mod (C) and the occurrence of Lend as both happen
synchronously, thus achieving the guard-action atomicity. Once Lend has occurred, Return can occur without
any condition, as the value of start has now become false.
We developed an automatic translator tool from eb3 specifications to LNT, named eb32lnt, implemented
using the Ocaml Lex/Yacc compiler construction technology. It consists of about 900 lines of OCaml code. We
applied eb32lnt on a benchmark of eb3 specifications, which includes variations of the library management
system.
We noticed that, for each eb3 specification, the code size of the equivalent LNT specification is twice as
big. Part of this expansion is caused by the fact that LNT is more structured than eb3: LNT requires more
keywords and gates have to be declared and passed as parameters to each process call. By looking at the Rules
of Figure 9, we can see that the other causes of expansion are Rule (5), which duplicates the condition C, and
Rule (9), which duplicates the body E0 of the quantified parallel composition operator “|[∆]|x :V :E0” as
many times as there are elements in the set V . Both expansions are linear in the size of the source eb3 code.
However, in the case of a nested parallel composition “|[∆1]|x1 :V1 : . . . |[∆n]|xn :Vn :E0”, the expansion
factor is as high as the product of the number of elements in the respective sets V1, . . . , Vn, which may be
large. If E0 is a big process expression, the expansion can be limited by encapsulating E0 in a parameterized
process “PE0 (x1, . . . , xn)” and replacing duplicated occurrences of E0 by appropriate instances of PE0 .
10. Case Study Revisited
We illustrate below the application of the eb32lnt translator in conjunction with CADP for analyzing an
extended version of the IS library management system, whose description in eb3 can be found in Annex C
of [Ger06]. With respect to the simplified version presented in Section 3, the IS enables e.g., members to renew
their loans and to reserve books, and their reservations to be cancelled or transferred to other members on
demand. The desired behaviour of this IS was characterized in [FFC10] as a set of 15 requirements expressed
informally as follows:
R1. A book can always be acquired by the library when it is not currently acquired.
R2. A book cannot be acquired by the library if it is already acquired.
R3. An acquired book can be discarded only if it is neither borrowed nor reserved.
R4. A person must be a member of the library in order to borrow a book.
R5. A book can be reserved only if it has been borrowed or already reserved by some member.
R6. A book cannot be reserved by the member who is borrowing it.
R7. A book cannot be reserved by a member who is reserving it.
R8. A book cannot be lent to a member if it is reserved.
R9. A member cannot renew a loan or give the book to another member if the book is reserved.
R10. A member is allowed to take a reserved book only if he owns the oldest reservation.
R11. A book can be taken only if it is not borrowed.
R12. A member who has reserved a book can cancel the reservation at anytime before he takes it.
R13. A member can relinquish library membership only when all his loans have been returned and all his
reservations have either been used or cancelled.
R14. Ultimately, there is always a procedure that enables a member to leave the library.
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Table 1. Model checking results for the library management system
(m, p) (3,2) (3,3) (3,4) (4,3)
states 1,002 182,266 8,269,754 27,204,016
trans. 5,732 1,782,348 105,481,364 330,988,232
time 1.9s 14.4s 31’39s 140’22s
R1 0.3s 1.8s 5’19s 20’13s
R2 0.2s 2.9s 9’26s 36’7s
R3 0.2s 9.4s 97’46s 26’47s
R4 0.2s 1.7s 5’15s 18’40s
R5 0.2s 2.2s 6’46s 21’52s
R6 0.2s 4.1s 38’30s 10’19s
R7 0.2s 7.4s 65’22s 24’33s
R8 0.2s 2.2s 6’52s 22’27s
R9 0.2s 2.3s 6’38s 22’29s
R10 0.3s 13.3s 43’59s 62’07s
R11 0.3s 2.5s 6’36s 22’14s
R12 0.3s 4.0s 10’47s 45’09s
R13 0.4s 4.3s 11’46s 36’07s
R14 0.3s 3.6s 10’41s 37’33s
R15 0.2s 2.8s 7’53s 28’56s
R15. A member cannot borrow more than the loan limit defined at the system level for all users.
We expressed all the above requirements using the property specification language MCL [MT08]. We
show below the MCL formulation of two requirements from the list above, which denote typical safety and
liveness properties. Requirement R2 is expressed in MCL as follows:
[ true∗.{ACQUIRE ?B : string}.(not {DISCARD !B})∗.{ACQUIRE !B} ] false
This formula uses the standard safety pattern “[β] false”, which forbids the existence of transition sequences
matching the regular formula β. Here the undesirable sequences are those containing two Acquire operations
for the same book B without a Discard operation for B in the meantime. The regular formula true∗ matches
a subsequence of (zero or more) transitions labeled by arbitrary actions. Note the use of the construct
“?B : string”, which matches any string and extracts its value in the variable B used later in the formula.
Therefore, the above formula captures all occurrences of books carried by Acquire operations in the model.
Requirement R12 is formulated in MCL as follows:
[ true∗.{RESERVE ?M : string ?B : string}.
(not ({TAKE !M !B} or {TRANSFER !M !B}))∗ ]
〈 (not ({TAKE !M !B} or {TRANSFER !M !B}))∗. {CANCEL !M !B} 〉 true
This formula denotes a liveness property of the form “[β1] 〈β2〉 true”, which states that every transition
sequence matching the regular formula β1 (in this case, book B has been reserved by member M and subse-
quently neither taken nor transferred) ends in a state from which there exists a transition sequence matching
the regular formula β2 (in this case, the reservation can be cancelled before being taken or transferred).
Requirement R7 can be formulated as follows:
[ true∗ . {RESERVE ?M : string ?B : string} . (not ({TAKE !M !B} or {CANCEL !M !B}))∗ .
{RESERVE !M !B} ] false
All requirements formulated in MCL can be found in Appendix C.
Using eb32lnt, we translated the eb3 specification of the library management system to LNT. The
resulting specification was checked against all the 15 requirements, formulated in MCL, using the EVAL-
UATOR 4.0 model checker of CADP. The experiments were performed on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU
880 at 3.07GHz. Table 1 shows the results for several configurations of the IS, obtained by instantiating
the number of books (m) and members (p) in the IS. All requirements were shown to be valid on the IS
specification. The second and third line of the table indicate the number of states and transitions of the LTS
corresponding to the LNT specification. The fourth line gives the time needed to generate the LTS and the
other lines give the verification time for each requirement.
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Note that the number of states generated increases with the size of m and p as EVALUATOR 4.0 applies
explicit techniques for state space generation. According to Table 1, verifying the library management system
becomes intractable for more than four members and four books. This misbehaviour is mainly attributed
to the presence of parallel compositions between members and books as well as the loose synchronisation
between these components leading to exponential growth of the state space.
Comparison with [FFC10] We recall that CADP was used in [FFC10] for the verification of a version of
the library management system with similar functionalities. According to the same paper, the time needed
to generate the corresponding LTS for NbLoans = 1, was 970.2 sec approximately, the average time needed
to verify the system requirements was 74.63 sec and no information is provided for the size of the LTS, which
means that no reliable comparison of the two works is possible. Note also that the LNT specification, to
whom the results of Table 1 are related, was automatically generated by eb32lnt, whereas the results of
[FFC10] correspond to a manual LNT specification of the library management system.
Regarding the other verification tools employed in [FFC10], only verification with ALLOY outperforms
our verification scheme with CADP, which is normal as in [FFC10] in the case of reachability properties for
example the traces needed to satisfy them are specified by the user, which implies that automatic verification
with ALLOY as done in [FFC10] is not automatic and therefore not adequate.
11. Conclusion
We proposed an approach for equipping the eb3 method with formal verification capabilities by reusing
already available model checking technology. Our approach relies upon a new translation from eb3 to LNT,
which provides a direct connection to all the state-of-the-art verification features of the CADP toolbox.
The translation, based on alternative memory semantics of eb3 [VD13] instead of the original trace seman-
tics [FSt03], was automated by the eb32lnt translator and validated on several examples of typical ISs. So
far, we experimented only the model checking of MCL data-based temporal properties on eb3 specifications.
However, CADP also provides extensive support for equivalence checking and compositional LTS construc-
tion, which can be of interest to IS designers. We also provided a formal proof of the translation from eb3
to LNT that can be found in [Vek14], which could serve as reference for translating eb3 to other process
algebras as well.
eb32lnt offers insight to interested readers on:
• how to code global state as a process running parallel to the principal system specification, and
• how to solve the atomicity problem (imposing the simultaneous evaluation of C with the execution of the
first action of E in expressions of the form C ⇒ E) by a way of another process running to the principal
system specification.
On the other hand, the main limitation of the proposed translation is that model-checking becomes in-
tractable for specifications describing multiple concurrent processes as is the case for the library specification
for more than four members and four books. This inconvenience is attributed mainly to:
• the frequent use of parallel composition operators in eb3specifications that lead to the exponential growth
of execution traces, and
• the fact that CADP employs explicit techniques instead of symbolic techniques for state space generation.
Another drawback of the proposed translation arises at the stage of property verification. Properties should
be expressed in MCL, which implies that eb3 users should be familiar with MCL’s syntax. However, one
should note that the whole scale of MCL formulas can be used for the verification of eb3specifications,
despite the fact that the emphasis of this paper is given on safety and liveness properties.
As future work, we plan to study abstraction techniques for verifying properties regardless of the number
of entity instances that participate in the IS, following the approaches for parameterized model check-
ing [ABJ+99]. This study will establish the fact that verifying systems with many components (members
and books in our case) is equivalent to verifying systems with the same structure as before, but less com-
ponents. In particular, we will observe how the insertion of new functionalities into an IS affects this issue,
and we will formalize this in the context of eb3 specifications.
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A. LNT Code for the Simplified Library Management System
We give the optimized LNT code for the simplified Library Management System, with 2 members, 1 book,
and NbLoans set to 1.
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module library is
type mId is m1,m2,m⊥ with ”eq”, ”ne”, ”ord”, ”val” end type
type BID is b1, b⊥ with ”eq”, ”ne”, ”ord”, ”val” end type
type NB is array[0..2] of NAT end type
type BOR is array[0..1] of MID end type
process M [Acquire,Discard ,Register ,Unregister ,Lend ,Return : any] is
var mId : MID , bId : BID , bId ′ : BID ,
mId ′ : MID , borrower : BOR, nbLoans : NB in
mId := m⊥; borrower := BOR(m⊥); nbLoans := NB(0);
loop
select
Acquire (?bId)
[] Discard (?bId , ?borrower)
[] Register (?mId)
[] Unregister (?mId)
[] Lend (?bId , ?mId , !nbLoans, !borrower);
borrower [ord (bId)] := mId ;
nbLoans [ord (mId)] := nbLoans [ord (mId)] + 1
[] RET (?bId);
mId ′ := borrower [ord (bId)];
nbLoans [ord (mId ′)] := nbLoans [ord (mId ′)]− 1;
borrower [ord (bId)] := m⊥
end select
end loop
end var
end process
process loan [Lend ,Return : any] (mId : mId , bId : BID) is
var borrower : BOR, nbLoans : NB in (* NbLoans is set to 1 *) in
Lend (bId , mId , ?nbLoans, ?borrower)
where
(
(borrower [ord (bId)] eq m⊥) and (nbLoans [ord (mId)] eq 1)
)
;
Return (bId)
end var
end process
process book [Acquire,Discard : any] (bId : BID) is
var borrower : BOR in
Acquire(bId); Discard (bId , ?borrower) where (borrower [ord (bId)] eq m⊥)
end var
end process
process member [Register ,Unregister ,Lend ,Return : any] (mId : mId) is
Register (mId);
loop L in
select break L [] loan [Lend ,Return] (mId , b1)
end select
end loop;
Unregister (mId)
end process
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process Main [Acquire,Discard ,Register ,Unregister ,Lend ,Return : any] is
par Acquire,Discard ,Register ,Unregister ,Lend ,Return in
par
loop L in
select break L [] book [Acquire,Discard] (b1)
end select
end loop
||
par
loop L in
select break L [] member [Register ,Unregister ,Lend ,Return] (m1)
end select
end loop
||
loop L in
select break L [] member [Register ,Unregister ,Lend ,Return] (m2)
end select
end loop
end par
end par
||
M [Acquire,Discard ,Register ,Unregister ,Lend ,Return]
end par
end process
end module
B. LNT Code for the Extended Library Management System
We give the LNT code for the extended Library Management System (NbLoans = 1). This code is generated
by eb32lnt except the functions “add reservation”,“cancel reservation”, “last reservation”, “nil reservation”
and “is reserved”, which are coded by hand, since our compiler does not support user-defined eb3 types and
(non-attribute) functions. We also define type “RESERV ” to simplify the coding. By convention, for every
type T we have ord(⊥) = 0, ord(firstT ) = 1, etc.
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module library is
type mId is m1,m2,m⊥ with “eq”, “ne”, “ord”, “val” end type
type BID is b1, b2, b⊥ with “eq”, “ne”, “ord”, “val” end type
type MIDLIST is
NIL,CONS (HD : MID , TL : MIDLIST ) with ”eq”, ”ne” end type
type ACQUIR is array [0..1] of BOOL end type
type BOR is array [0..1] of MID end type
type NB is array [0..1] of NAT end type
type RESERV is array [0..1] of MIDLIST end type
function add reservation (m : MID , l : MIDLIST ) : MIDLIST is
case l in var temp mem : MID , temp list : MIDLIST in
NIL→ return CONS (m,NIL)
| CONS (temp mem, temp list)→
return CONS (temp mem, add reservation(m, temp list))
end case
end function
function cancel reservation (m : MID , l : MIDLIST ) : MIDLIST is
case l in var temp mem : MID , temp list : MIDLIST in
NIL→ return NIL
| CONS (temp mem, temp list) where (temp mem eq m)→ return temp list
| CONS (temp mem, temp list)→
return CONS (temp mem, cancel reservation(m, temp list))
end case
end function
function nil reservation (l : MIDLIST ) : BOOL is
case l in var temp list : MIDLIST in
NIL→ return true
| ANY MIDLIST → return false
end case
end function
function is reserved (m : MID , l : MIDLIST ) : MIDLIST is
case l in var temp mem : MID , temp list : MIDLIST in
NIL→ return false
| CONS (temp mem, temp list) where (temp mem eq m)→ return true
| CONS (temp mem, temp list)→ return is reserved(m, temp list)
end case
end function
function last reservation (m : MID , l : MIDLIST ) : BOOL is
case l in var temp mem : MID , temp list : MIDLIST in
NIL→ return false
| CONS (temp mem, temp list) where (temp mem eq m)→ return true
| CONS (temp mem, temp list)→ return false
end case
end function
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process M [Acquire,Discard ,Register ,Lend ,Take,Renew ,Return,Reserve,
Cancel ,Unregister ,Transfer : any] is
var mId : mId , bId : BID , acquired : ACQUIR,
borrower : BOR, nbLoans : NB , reservation : RESERV in
acquired := ACQUIR(false); borrower := BOR(m⊥);
nbLoans := NB(0); reservation : RESERV (NIL);
loop
select
Acquire (?bId);
acquired [ord (bId)] := true
[] Discard (?bId , !borrower, !reservation);
acquired [ord ()] := false
[] Register (?mId);
nbLoans [ord (mId)] := 1
[] Unregister (?mId !nbLoans !reservation)
nbLoans [ord (mId)] := 0
[] Lend (?bId , ?mId , !acquired, !borrower, !reservation, !nbloans);
borrower [ord (bId)] := mId ;
nbLoans [ord (mId)] := nbLoans [ord (mId)] + 1
[] Reserve (?mId , ?bId , !acquired, !borrower, !reservation);
reservation [ord (bId)] := add reservation(mId , reservation [ord (bId)])
[] Take (?mId , ?bId , !acquired, !borrower, !reservation, !nbLoans);
borrower [ord (bId)] := mId ;
nbLoans [ord (mId)] := nbLoans [ord (mId)] + 1;
reservation [ord (bId)] := cancel reservation(mId , reservation [ord (bId)])
[] Cancel (?mId , ?bId);
reservation [ord (bId)] := cancel reservation(mId , reservation [ord (bId)])
[] Transfer (?mId , ?bId , !acquired, !borrower, !reservation, !nbLoans);
nbLoans [ord (borrower [ord (bId)])] := nbLoans [ord (borrower [ord (bId)])]− 1;
borrower [ord (bId)] := mId ;
nbLoans [ord (mId)] := nbLoans [ord (mId)] + 1
[] Renew (?bId , !acquired, !borrower, !reservation)
[] Return (?bId , !acquired, !borrower);
nbLoans [ord (borrower [ord (bId)])] := nbLoans [ord (borrower [ord (bId)])]− 1;
borrower [ord (bId)] := m⊥
end loop
end var
end process
process book [Acquire,Discard : any] (bId : BID) is
var acquired : ACQUIR, borrower : BOR, reservation : RESERV in
Acquire(bId); Discard (bId , ?borrower, ?reservation)
where ((borrower [ord (bId)] eq m⊥) and
(nil reservation (reservation[ord (bId)]) eq true))
end var
end process
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process member [Lend ,Take,Renew ,Return,Reserve,Cancel ,Transfer : any]
(mId : MID , bId : BID) is
var acquired : ACQUIR, borrower : BOR, reservation : RESERV , nbLoans : NB in
select
Lend (!bId , !mId , ?acquired, ?borrower, ?reservation, ?nbloans)
where ((acquired [ord (bId)] eq true) and (borrower[ord (bId)] eq m⊥) and
(nbLoans[ord (mId)] lt 2) and
(nil reservation (reservation [ord (bId)] eq true))
loop L in select break L []
Renew (!bId , ?acquired, ?borrower, ?reservation)
where ((acquired [ord (bId)] eq true) and (borrower[ord (bId)] eq mId) and
(nil reservation (reservation [ord (bId)]) eq true))
end select end loop;
select
Return (!bId , ?acquired, ?borrower)
where ((acquired [ord (bId)] eq true) and (borrower[ord (bId)] eq mId))
[] var mId ′ : MID in
mId ′ := any MID where ((mId ′ ne m⊥) and (mId ′ ne m⊥));
Transfer (!mId ′, !bId , ?acquired, ?borrower, ?reservation, ?nbLoans)
where ((acquired [ord (bId)] eq true) and (borrower [ord (bId)] eq mId) and
(nbLoans [ord (mId ′)] gt 0) and (nbLoans [ord (mId ′)] lt 2) and
(nil reservation (reservation [ord (bId)]) eq true))
end var
end select
[] Reserve (!mId , !bId , ?acquired, ?borrower, ?reservation, ?nbLoans)
where ((acquired [ord (bId)] eq true) and
(borrower[ord (bId)] ne m⊥) and (borrower[ord (bId)] ne mId) and
(is reserved (mId , reservation [ord (bId)]) eq false);
select
Take (!mId , !bId , ?acquired, ?borrower, ?reservation, ?nbloans)
where ((acquired [ord (bId)] eq true) and
(borrower[ord (bId)] eq m⊥) and (nbLoans[ord (mId)] lt 2) and
(last reservation (mId , reservation [ord (bId)]) eq true))
[] Cancel (!mId , !bId)
end select
[] Return (!bId , ?acquired, ?borrower)
where ((acquired [ord (bId)] eq true) and (borrower[ord (bId)] eq mId))
[] var mId ′ : MID in
mId ′ := any MID where ((mId ′ ne m⊥) and (mId ′ ne m⊥));
Transfer (!mId ′, !bId , ?acquired, ?borrower, ?reservation, ?nbLoans)
where ((acquired [ord (bId)] eq true) and (borrower [ord (bId)] eq mId) and
(nbLoans [ord (mId ′)] gt 0) and (nbLoans [ord (mId ′)] lt 2) and
(nil reservation (reservation [ord (bId)]) eq true))
end var
end select
end var
end process
process Main [Register ,Lend ,Take,Renew ,Return,Reserve,Cancel ,Unregister ,
Acquire,Discard : any] is
par Register ,Lend ,Take,Renew ,Return,Reserve,Cancel ,Unregister ,Acquire,Discard in
par
par
loop L1 in select break L1 []
book [Acquire,Discard] (b1)
end select end loop
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||
loop L1 in select break L1 []
book [Acquire,Discard] (b2)
end select end loop
end par
||
par
loop L1 in select break L1 []
Register(m1);
par
loop L2 in select break L2 []
member [Lend ,Take,Renew ,Return,Reserve,Cancel ,Transfer] (m1, b1)
end select end loop
||
loop L2 in select break L2 []
member [Lend ,Take,Renew ,Return,Reserve,Cancel ,Transfer] (m1, b2)
end select end loop;
end par;
var nbLoans : NB , bId : BID , reservation : RESERV in
Unregister (m1, ?nbLoans, ?reservation)
where ((nbLoans [ord (m1)] eq 1) and
(is reserved (m1, reservation [ord (b1)]) eq false) and
(is reserved (m1, reservation [ord (b2)]) eq false))
end var
end select end loop
||
loop L1 in select break L1 []
Register(m2);
par
loop L2 in select break L2 []
member [Lend ,Take,Renew ,Return,Reserve,Cancel ,Transfer] (m2, b1)
end select end loop
||
loop L2 in select break L2 []
member [Lend ,Take,Renew ,Return,Reserve,Cancel ,Transfer] (m2, b2)
end select end loop
end par;
var nbLoans : NB , bId : BID , reservation : RESERV in
Unregister (m2, ?nbLoans, ?reservation)
where ((nbLoans [ord (m2)] eq 1) and
(is reserved (m2, reservation [ord (b1)]) eq false) and
(is reserved (m2, reservation [ord (b2)]) eq false))
end var
end select end loop;
end par
||
M [Acquire,Discard ,Register ,Lend ,Take,Renew ,Return,Reserve,Cancel ,Unregister ,
Transfer]
end par
end process
end module
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C. MCL Formulas for Requirements R1 to R15
Requirement R1 “A book can always be acquired by the library when it is not currently acquired”
macro R1 (B) =
(
[ (not {ACQUIRE !B})∗ ] 〈 {ACQUIRE !B} 〉 true
and
[ true∗ . {DISCARD !B} . (not {ACQUIRE !B})∗ ] 〈 {ACQUIRE !B} 〉 true
)
end macro
R1 ("B1") and R1 ("B2") and R1 ("B3")
This is a classical liveness property. The second conjunct of “R1 (B)” expresses the eventuality that a
book be withdrawn from the library before it is reacquired.
Requirement R3 “An acquired book can be discarded only if it is neither borrowed nor reserved”
[ true∗ . {?G : string ?any : string ?B : string where (G = "LEND") or (G = "TAKE")} .
(not {RETURN !B})∗ . {DISCARD !B} ] false
and
[ true∗.{RESERVE ?any : string ?B : string} .
(not ({CANCEL ?any : string !B} or {RETURN !B}))∗ . {DISCARD !B} ] false
Requirement R4 “A person must be a member of the library in order to borrow a book”
macro R4 (M) =
(
[ (not {JOIN !M})∗ . ({LEND !M ?any : string} or {TAKE !M ?any : string}) ] false
and
[ true∗.{LEAVE !M} . (not {JOIN !M})∗ .
({LEND !M ?any : string} or {TAKE !M ?any : string}) ] false
)
end macro
R4 ("M1") and R4 ("M2") and R4 ("M3")
The first conjunct or “R4 (M)” expresses the fact that a member cannot borrow a book if (s)he has not
registered to the library. The second conjunct expresses that if a member relinquishes his/her membership,
(s)he may not lend a book neither via the regular loan action LEND nor the reservation action RESERVE.
Requirement R5 “A book can be reserved only if it has been borrowed or already reserved by some member”
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macro R5 (B) =
(
[ (not ({LEND ?any : string !B} or {TAKE ?any : string !B}))∗ .
{RESERVE ?any : string !B} ] false
and
[ true∗ . {RETURN !B} .
(not ({LEND ?any : string !B} or {TAKE ?any : string !B}))∗ . {RESERVE !B} ] false
and
[ (not ({LEND ?any : string !B} or {TAKE ?any : string !B} or
{TRANSFER ?any : string !B} or {RESERVE ?any : string !B}))∗ .
{RESERVE ?any : string !B} ] false
)
end macro
R5 ("B1") and R5 ("B2") and R5 ("B3")
The first conjunct expresses the obligation for a book not to be lent in order to be added to the reservation
list. The second conjunct complements the first in the sense that at least one loan cycle is completed in the
beginning of the transition sequence via “{ RETURN !B }” thus making the book available for loan again.
The third conjunct denies any reservation history for the book in question. All possible loan operations
should be excluded as well.
Requirement R6 “A book cannot be reserved by the member who is borrowing it”
[ true∗.{LEND ?M : string ?B : string} .
(not ({RETURN !B} or {TRANSFER ?M2 : string !B}))∗ . {RESERVE !M !B} ] false
The difficulty here lies in the fact that the borrower may transfer the book to another member. For this
reason, the following formula is false.
[ true∗ . {LEND ?M : string ?B : string} . (not ({RETURN !B}))∗ . {RESERVE !M !B} ] false
Requirement R8 “A book cannot be lent to a member if it is reserved”
macro R8 (B,M1,M2) =
(
[ true∗ . {RESERVE !M1 !B} . (not ({TAKE !M1 !B} or {CANCEL !M1 !B}))∗ .
{LEND !M2 !B} ] false
)
end macro
R8 ("B1", "M1", "M2")
In this case (as well as for the subsequent requirements R9, R11, R13, R14, and R15), we only check
the property for a specific book (B1) and members (M1, M2). So doing, we exploit the symmetry of the
specification (all books and members have similar behaviour), which is crucial to avoid the exponential state
space explosion.
Requirement R9 “A member cannot renew a loan or give the book to another member if the book is
reserved”
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macro R9 (B,M) =
(
[ true∗ . {RESERVE !M !B} . (not ({TAKE !M !B} or {CANCEL !M !B}))∗ . {RENEW !B} ] false
)
end macro
R9 ("B1", "M1")
Requirement R10 “A member is allowed to take a reserved book only if he owns the oldest reservation”
[
true∗ .
{RESERVE ?M1 : string ?B : string} .
(not ({TAKE !M1!B} or {CANCEL !M1!B} or {TRANSFER !M1!B}))∗ .
{RESERVE ?M2 : string !B where M2 6= M1} .
(not ({TAKE !M1!B} or {CANCEL !M1!B} or {TRANSFER !M1!B}))∗ .
{TAKE !M2!B}
] false
This property has been rephrased in the following way: If two members reserve a book, the first member
to get it, is the first to have ordered it.
Requirement R11 “A book can be taken only if it is not borrowed”
macro R11 (B,M) =
(
[ true∗ . ({LEND !M !B} or {TAKE !M !B}) . (not ({RETURN !B}))∗ .
({LEND !M !B} or {TAKE !M !B}) . (not ({RETURN !B}))∗ . {RETURN !B} ] false
)
end macro
R11 ("B1", "M1")
This property corresponds to the pattern “α1 does not occur between α2 and α3”, which is expressed by
the following scheme, easily recognizable in this formula:
[ true∗ . α2 . (not α3)∗ . α1 . (not α3)∗ . α3 ] false
Requirement R13 “A member can relinquish library membership only when all his loans have been returned
and all his reservations have either been used or cancelled”
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macro R13 (B,M) =
(
[ true∗ .
({LEND !M !B} or {TAKE !M !B}) .
(not ({RETURN !B} or {TRANSFER !"M2" !B} or {TRANSFER !"M3" !B}))∗ .
{LEAVE !M} . (not ({RETURN !B} or {TRANSFER !"M2" !B} or {TRANSFER !"M3" !B}))∗ .
({RETURN !B} or {TRANSFER !"M2" !B} or {TRANSFER !"M3" !B}) ] false
and
[ true∗ . {RESERVE !M !B} . (not ({TAKE !M !B} or {CANCEL !M !B}))∗ .
{LEAVE !M} . (not ({TAKE !M !B} or {CANCEL !M !B}))∗ .
({TAKE !M !B} or {CANCEL !M !B}) ] false
)
end macro
R13 ("B1", "M1")
Requirement R14 “Ultimately, there is always a procedure that enables a member to leave the library”
macro R14 (M) =
(
[ true∗ . {JOIN !M} . (not {LEAVE !M})∗ ] 〈 (not {LEAVE !M})∗ . {LEAVE !M} 〉 true
)
end macro
R14 ("M1")
Requirement R15 “A member cannot borrow more than the loan limit defined at the system level for all
users”
macro R15 (M) =
(
[ true∗ . let B1 : string := "B1", B2 : string := "B2" in
({LEND !M !B1} or {TAKE !M !B1}) .
(not ({TRANSFER ?M2 : string !B1} or {RETURN !B1}))∗ .
({LEND !M !B2} or {TAKE !M !B2}) end let ] false
)
end macro
R15 ("M1")
This property is dependent on the maximum number NbLoans of books a member can have at any time
in his/her possession. In the above, NbLoans was set to two.
